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Information Extraction from a Strategic Sender: The
Zero Error Case
Anuj S. Vora, Ankur A. Kulkarni
Abstract—We introduce a setting where a receiver aims
to perfectly recover a source known privately to a strate-
gic sender over a possibly noisy channel. The sender is
endowed with a utility function and sends signals to the
receiver with the aim of maximizing this utility. Due to
the strategic nature of the sender not all the transmitted
information is truthful, which leads to question: how much
true information can be recovered by the receiver from such
a sender? We study this question in this paper. We pose the
problem as a game between the sender and receiver, where
the receiver tries to maximize the number of sequences
that can be recovered perfectly and the sender maximizes
its utility. We show that, in spite of the sender being
strategic and the presence of noise in the channel, there is
a strategy for the receiver by which it can perfectly recover
an exponentially large number of sequences. Our analysis
leads to the notion of the information extraction capacity of
the sender which quantifies the growth rate of the number
of recovered sequences with blocklength, in the presence of
a noiseless channel. We identify cases where this capacity
is equal to its theoretical maximum, and also when it is
strictly less than maximum. In the latter case, we show
that the capacity is sandwiched between the independence
number and the Shannon capacity of a suitably defined
graph. These results lead to an exact characterization of the
information extraction capacity in large number of cases.
We show that in the presence of a noisy channel, the rate
of information extraction achieved by the receiver is the
minimum of the zero-error capacity of the channel and the
information extraction capacity of the sender. Our analysis
leads to insights into a novel regime of communication
involving strategic agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a setting with a sender and a receiver, where
the receiver wishes to perfectly recover information pri-
vately known to the sender over a possibly noisy channel.
In the classical setting of communication, the sender
cooperates with the receiver in achieving this goal. In
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this paper, we consider a departure from this setting.
We assume that the sender wishes to maximize a utility
function that depends on the true source sequence and
the sequence recovered by receiver. This utility function
dictates the sender’s signalling strategy, and maximizing
it may not align with the interests of the receiver. In
other words, for certain source sequences, the sender
may want that the receiver is deceived into recovering
an incorrect sequence, whereas for other sequences it may
want that the receiver knows the truth. The receiver, on the
other hand, is still interested in recovering the true source
sequence1. We ask the following question in this paper –
given the channel and the sender’s tendency to misreport
the source information, what is the maximum amount of
information that the receiver can extract from the sender?
We call this the problem of information extraction from
a strategic sender. We study two formulations of the
problem, one with a noiseless channel and another with
a noisy channel, and develop a theory that establishes
achievable rates and converses for this setting, in the zero-
error regime.
This unconventional setting between a sender and a
receiver is important in networked control systems such as
IoT and smart grids. These systems comprise of multiple
entities like sensors, controllers and smart devices, that
are remotely connected via communication channels. In a
typical scenario, a sender such as a fusion center collects
information observed by the sensors and transmits it via
a communication channel to a controller. The controller
then takes appropriate actions to achieve a certain ob-
jective. However, such networked systems are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks which may cause the sender to act
maliciously and misrepresent its information. Matters are
further complicated since the controller has access only
to the output message of the channel, which may be a
noisy version of the sender’s message. These networked
1For example, recall the tale of a mischievous boy (sender) who
observes a source that can be two possible states: wolf and nowolf.
The villagers (receiver) want to know if there is indeed a wolf. But the
boy derives a utility U (x′, x) when the true state is x and the villagers
decode it to be x′. In the classical tale, when there is no wolf, the boy
wants the villagers to think there is a wolf, i.e., U (wolf, nowolf) >
U (nowolf, nowolf). But when there is a wolf, he wants them to infer
that there is really a wolf, i.e., U (wolf, wolf) > U (nowolf, wolf).
2systems form the backbone of critical systems and their
failure could be catastrophic. Thus, it is important to study
this problem and determine ways by which the receiver
which ensure information extraction from the sender.
The above examples differ from the situation where the
sender is defunct and reports arbitrarily corrupted infor-
mation. A defunct sender is indifferent between multiple
sequences recovered by the receiver and hence its output
may be uncorrelated to the observed sequence. A strategic
sender, on the other hand, is driven by its utility function
which induces a preference relation among the sequences
recovered by the receiver. Such a sender actively chooses
to report a select few sequences incorrectly, whereas for
other sequences, it may choose to report truthfully. Unlike
that of defunct sender, the messages transmitted by the
strategic sender have a pattern that can be exploited by
the receiver. This opens the door to possibilities of ex-
tracting nontrivial amount of information from the sender,
something we show in this paper.
A. Main results
The setting of our paper requires a new vantage
point for analysis since standard information-theoretic
constructs such as codebooks and decoding sets are not
directly suited for this problem. Nonetheless, our problem
is, in spirit, an information-theoretic problem and we find
that many tools and concepts from information theory
(such as typicality and Shannon capacity of graphs) play
an important role in our analysis. Since the sender and
receiver are not cooperating, we formulate the problem as
a game and study the Stackelberg equilibria of this game
with the receiver as the leader (we discuss the suitability
of this concept later in the paper).
Our main results concern the notion of the rate of infor-
mation extraction achieved by a Stackelberg equilibrium
of the above game. We show that despite the sender misre-
porting its information and the possible presence of noise
in the channel, there is a large class of utility functions
of the sender for which the receiver can recover a large
amount of information from the sender. Indeed, for such
utility functions, when the channel is noiseless, the rate of
information extraction is the theoretical maximum which
is q, the alphabet of the source. We also identify utility
functions for which the rate of information extraction is
strictly less than q. In the presence of a noisy channel,
the rate of information extraction is the minimum of the
Shannon capacity of the channel and the noiseless rate of
information extraction.
We model the problem as follows. The sender observes
a sequence of randomly generated symbols. The sender
encodes this information into a message and transmits
it to the receiver via a channel. The receiver maps the
output of the channel into a “recovered” string. Since we
study the problem from the point of view of the receiver,
we formulate the problem as a leader-follower game with
the receiver as the leader and the sender as the follower
and analyze it based on the Stackelberg equilibrium. We
show that the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy of the
receiver is to commit to a decoding function that decodes
only a subset of the sequences correctly and deliberately
induces error on the rest of the sequences. This type of
cynical strategy punishes the sender disproportionately
for misrepresentation. Effectively this strategy restricts
the sender by limiting its set of “feasible” responses and
ensures that the sender reports truthfully for the sequences
the receiver has chosen to recover perfectly.
The question then arises, how many such sequences
can possibly be recovered? To quantify the growth of
the set of perfectly recoverable sequences with increasing
blocklength, we define the information extraction capacity
of the sender, Ξ(U ), which is a function of the single-
letterized utility function U of the sender. We show that
in general the receiver can recover an exponential number
of sequences, whereby Ξ(U ) is always positive, barring
some corner cases. We identify a class of U ’s for which,
this number can be as high as ∼ qn, where n is the
blocklength, whereby Ξ(U ) = q. We then identify U ’s
for which Ξ(U ) < q. For such U ’s we show that the rate
Ξ(U ) is sandwiched between two important quantities,
α(Gs) ≤ Ξ(U ) ≤ Θ(Gs).
The quantity on the left α(Gs) is the independence
number of a suitably defined (single-letterized) graph Gs
that depends on the utility function U of the sender and
Θ(Gs) is the Shannon capacity of this graph. This result
directly shows that Ξ(U ) = α(Gs) = Θ(Gs) when Gs
is a perfect graph. When the channel is noisy, the rate of
information extraction is given by min{Ξ(U ),Θ(Gc)},
where Gc is the confusability graph of the channel.
Following are some insights that can be gleaned from
our analysis.
1) Receiver’s dilemma: Reflecting on the results, we
see the dilemma faced by the receiver in extracting infor-
mation from the sender. The key idea in the Stackelberg
equilibrium strategy of the receiver is to limit the options
of the sender for lying by selectively decoding only
a subset of the sequences. If the receiver attempts to
correctly decode a large number of sequences, then the
sender has greater freedom to lie about its information,
and the attempt of the receiver is counter-productive. On
the other hand, if the receiver chooses too few sequences
to decode correctly, then the sender is compelled to speak
truth given the limited choices, but number of sequences
recovered is less than optimal. The receiver thus has
3to balance these two aspects while choosing its optimal
strategy.
2) Relation to cooperative information theory: Fol-
lowing are some parallels and connections between our
theory and the cooperative setting of information theory.
We find that in the strategic setting, Ξ(U ) plays a role
loosely analogous to that played by the entropy of a
source in conventional communication theory. Thus, the
utility U of the sender is akin to the pmf of a source.
This analogy is loose because we are not concerned with a
stochastic setting in this paper (recall we work in the zero-
error regime). A much more complicated setting would
arise when considering vanishing probability of error; our
preliminary work on this line can be found in [3].
Coming to the channel, a notable feature of our setting
is that we assume that the channel input and output
spaces are the space of the source sequences itself. In the
standard communication-theoretic setting, in the noiseless
case, this would trivially lead to recovery of all the source
sequences. However, we show that the same does not hold
in our setting since the receiver chooses to selectively
decode only a portion of the outputs in its optimal
strategy. Attempting to decode too many channel outputs
is counter-productive in our setting. Thus, our results also
quantify the optimal amount of channel resources that
are required for the receiver to extract information from
with the sender. In a sense, this marks a shifts from the
traditional information-theoretic concept of capacity of a
channel to that of capacity utilization. We believe these
are glimpses into the fascinating world of results that lie
in this non-Shannon communication theoretic regime and
we hope to explore these in future work.
B. An additional motivating example
Our framework of information extraction can also be
motivated by the current situation induced by the Coro-
navirus epidemic where health officers try to detect and
isolate travellers possibly exposed to the virus. The officer
asks the travellers a set of questions in order to map
their complete travel history. The traveller, on the other
hand, may have an incentive to misreport its information
either to escape scrutiny or to avoid further delay in travel.
The travellers can be assumed to have an n-length period
of travel history. The travellers may prefer to lie about
some places in their travel period based on the degree of
the spread of the virus in those locations, and for some
locations, the traveller may have a verifiable history which
precludes lying. The officer has to design a questionnaire
that recovers the true travel history of the maximum num-
ber of travellers. It is evident that this reduces to the model
we described above (albeit with a noiseless channel), with
the traveller as the sender and the officer as the receiver.
Clearly, this toy model may not be an accurate depiction
of the real world scenario since our model assumes that
all travellers are homogeneous. Also, detecting travellers
with certain travel histories is more crucial than the others
whereas in our setting the receiver is indifferent between
all travel histories. Nevertheless, it captures the essence
of strategic questioning which is required to extract the
true information from a misreporting sender.
C. Related work
There have been works on strategic communication (of
various flavours) in the game theory community, but to the
best of our knowledge ours is the first formal information-
theoretic analysis of information extraction. The first
model of strategic communication was introduced by
Crawford and Sobel in [4]. They considered a sender and
a receiver with misaligned objectives and formulated a
simultaneous move game between the sender and receiver.
They showed that any equilibrium involves the sender
resorting to a quantization strategy, where the sender re-
ports only the interval in which its information lies. Some
variants and generalizations were subsequently studied in
(Battaglini [5], Saritas¸ et al. [6]). These works considered
the Nash equilibrium solution of the game. Strategic
communication in control theory has been studied by
Farokhi et al. in [7] and Sayin et al. in [8]. The authors
in [7] studied a problem of static and dynamic estimation
in the presence of strategic sensors as a game between
the sensors and a receiver. The authors in [8] considered
a dynamic signaling game between a strategic sender
and a receiver. Strategic communication has been studied
from the perspective of information theory by Akyol et
al in [9], [10] where they studied a sender-receiver game
and characterized equilibria satisfying a certain rate and
distortion levels. In [10], they also analyzed the effect of
side information at the receiver. Strategic communication
game is also studied in the information design setting [11],
[12] where the sender with superior information tries to
persuade the receiver to take an action that is favourable
for itself. The works [7]-[12] have formulated the game
with the sender as the leader.
Our work differs from the above models as follows. We
study the problem from the perspective of the receiver
and hence we formulate the game with the receiver as
the leader. We consider a model where the malicious
behaviour of the sender is explicitly governed by a utility
function and study information-theoretic quantities like
the information extraction capacity.
Our work significantly extends the results of the con-
ference version [1] where we discussed a special case of
sender’s utility and showed that the information extraction
capacity is bounded above by the Shannon capacity
4of a certain graph. In [3], [13], we studied a related
strategic communication problem where the receiver tried
to achieve asymptotically vanishing probability of error.
In [13], we considered a rate limited setting and we
determined sufficient and necessary conditions for reliable
communication. In [3], we considered an unconstrained
rate setting and we determined the achievable rates.
The paper is organized as follows. We formulate the
problem in Section II. In Section III, we determine the
equilibrium of the Stackelberg game with the noiseless
channel. In Section IV, we discuss the existence of in-
formation extraction capacity and derive bounds on the
capacity. Finally, we analyze the Stackelberg game with
the noisy channel in Section V. Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notation
Random variables are denoted with upper case letters
X,Y,Z and their instances are denoted as lower case
letters x, y, z. The space of scalar random variables is
denoted by the calligraphic letter X and the space of
vector valued random variables is denoted as X n. Note
that to declutter notation, unless stated otherwise, our
upper case letters X,Y,Z and their instances x, y, z will
be vector valued. The set of probability distributions on
a space is denoted as P(·). A generic graph G is denoted
as G = (V,E) where V is the set of vertices and E is the
set of edges. When two vertices x and y are connected via
an edge, we denote it either as (x, y) ∈ E or as x ∼ y.
For a graph G, the size of the largest independent set
is denoted as α(G). Matrices are denoted by uppercase
letters U,W,Q. For a function or a random variable, we
denote supp(·) as its support set. For an optimization
problem ‘·’, we denote OPT(·) as its optimal value.
B. Noiseless channel model
Let X = {0, 1, . . . , q−1}, where q ∈ N is the alphabet
size. The sender observes a sequence of source symbols
X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ X n, where Xi are randomly
generated. We do not assume any specific distribution for
X. The sender transmits a message sn(X) = Y ∈ X n,
where sn : X n → X n, as input to a channel. The
channel input and output spaces are both X n. In our
first model, we assume that the channel is noiseless and
hence the message is relayed perfectly to the receiver.
The receiver decodes the message as gn(Y ) = X̂ , where
gn : X n → X n ∪ ∆. Here ∆ is an error symbol and
it is introduced for convenience; we explain its meaning
subsequently.
Let
D(gn, sn) := {x ∈ X n | gn ◦ sn(x) = x} (1)
be the set of perfectly recovered sequences when the
receiver plays the strategy gn and the sender plays the
strategy sn. The n-block utility function of the sender,
Un : (X n ∪∆)× X n → R, is given as
Un(x̂, x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
U (x̂i, xi) ∀ x, x̂ ∈ X n, (2)
where U : X ×X → R is a single-letter utility function,
and Un(∆, x) = −∞ for all x ∈ X n and n ∈ N. In our
formulation, x is the source sequence observed by the
sender and x̂ is the sequence recovered by the receiver.
Thus, the utility of the sender is a function of the true
sequence and the sequence recovered by the receiver.
The receiver aims to maximize the size of the set
D(gn, sn) by choosing an appropriate strategy gn. The
sender, on the other hand, tries to maximize the utility
Un(gn ◦sn(x), x) by choosing an appropriate strategy sn.
We formulate this problem as a game between the sender
and receiver. In particular, we consider a leader-follower
game, also called a Stackelberg game, with the receiver
as the leader and the sender as the follower.
The game proceeds as follows. The receiver, being
the leader, plays and announces its strategy before the
sender. For a given strategy of the receiver, the sender
chooses a response that maximizes its utility. The receiver
anticipates this response of the sender and accordingly
chooses an optimal strategy that maximizes its objective,
i.e., a “decoding” function which, when composed with
the sender’s “encoding” strategy, recovers the maximum
number of the sequences perfectly. This leads to the
equilibrium concept called the Stackelberg equilibrium
solution [14].
Definition 2.1 (Stackelberg equilibrium): In a Stackel-
berg equilibrium, the strategy of the receiver is given as
g∗n ∈ argmaxgn minsn∈B(gn) |D(gn, sn)|, (3)
where the best response set of the sender, B(gn), is given
as
B(gn) =
{
sn : X n → X n |
Un(gn ◦ sn(x), x) ≥ Un(gn ◦ s′n(x), x)
∀ x ∈ X n,∀ s′n
}
. (4)
The best response set of the sender for a strategy gn
of the receiver is a collection of strategies sn such that
for any strategy s′n and any observed sequence x, the
sequence recovered by the receiver, gn ◦ sn(x), gives the
highest utility compared to the sequence gn ◦ s′n(x).
Note that in (3), we minimize over the set B(gn) of
the sender. We incorporate this minimization because,
in general, the best response of the sender may not be
unique. Since the receiver does not have control over
5the choice of the sender’s best response, we assume that
the receiver chooses its strategy according to the worst-
case scenario and hence adopts a pessimistic viewpoint.
Alternatively, an optimistic receiver would maximize over
B(gn). We do not consider the optimistic formulation in
this paper.
We consider this formulation apt for our setting due to
the following reasons. In a Stackelberg game the leader
plays its strategy before the follower and hence has an
advantage in the game. The follower is thus aware of the
strategy of the leader and chooses its response accord-
ingly. Since we study a problem where the receiver tries
to extract information from the sender, we can assume that
the receiver is aware of the strategic nature of the sender
and plays its strategy before the sender. For instance,
in a smart grid, the regulator is aware of the incentives
available to the consumers for misreporting the demand
and usage data. Its objective is to appropriately regulate
the load by extracting the true demand and usage data
from the consumers. In case of the health inspection of
the travellers, the health inspector is assumed to be aware
of the strategic nature of the travellers. The objective is
to extract the true travel history of maximum number
of travellers by designing a questionnaire that will be
available to all the travellers2.
We now discuss an example which demonstrates the
gameplay and some important aspects of game.
Example 2.1. Suppose n = 1. Let X = {0, 1, 2} and let
the utility of the sender U : X × X → R be as follows.
U (0, 0) = 1, U (1, 0) = 2, U (2, 0) = 0,
U (0, 1) = 0, U (1, 1) = 1, U (2, 1) = 1,
U (0, 2) = 0, U (1, 2) = 1, U (2, 2) = 2.
Thus, in our game U (i, j) denotes the utility obtained by
the sender when i ∈ X is the symbol recovered by the
receiver and j ∈ X is the symbol observed by the sender.
From the first row, we can see that U (2, 0) <
U (0, 0) < U (1, 0) and hence the sender prefers that the
receiver recovers the symbol 1 when the true symbol is
0. Further, U (1, 1) = U (2, 1) > U (0, 1) implying that
the sender equally prefers 1 and 2 when the observed
symbol is 1. Finally, from the last row, U (2, 2) >
U (0, 2),U (1, 2) implying that the sender prefers the
symbol 2 when the observed symbol is 2.
Suppose the receiver chooses a naive strategy g : X →
X ∪ ∆ as g(i) = i for all i ∈ X ; in this strategy the
2Note that the problem of information extraction we study is distinct
from the problem of information design [11], [12] or information
disclosure [10]. In these cases, the problem is studied from the per-
spective of the sender who “designs” the information that is observed
by the receiver so as to achieve an outcome that favours the sender.
Thereby, in such setting it is suitable to formulate the problem from
the viewpoint of the sender.
receiver blindly believes the sender’s word and maps it to
the same symbol. The best response set B(g) comprises
of two strategies s¯, ŝ, where
s¯(i) =

1 i = 0
1 i = 1
2 i = 2
, ŝ(i) =

1 i = 0
2 i = 1
2 i = 2
.
We can verify this as follows. Suppose the sender ob-
serves the sequence 0. For all strategies s : X → X , we
have
U (g ◦ s(0), 0) = U (s(0), 0) ≤ U (1, 0).
Thus, the optimal choice of strategy for the sender is such
that s(0) = 1 which gives g ◦ s(0) = 1. This calculation
can be repeated for the other symbols to find s¯ and ŝ.
It is easy to see that, when the receiver plays g and the
sender plays s¯, the set of perfectly decoded sequences is
D(g, s¯) = {1, 2}. Whereas when the sender plays ŝ, the
set is equal to D(g, ŝ) = {2}. Thus, in the worst case,
only one sequence is recovered perfectly, i.e.,
min
s∈B(g)
|D(g, s)| = 1.
The strategy g defined as above is a naive decoding
strategy for the receiver since it is an identity map. The
sender uses this to its advantage. Under both the strategies
s¯ and ŝ, the sender reports 0 as 1 and the receiver naively
decodes this message to 1. As a result, the receiver fails
to recover the sequence 0 and is thus deceived by the
sender.
However, the receiver can recover more than one se-
quence by cleverly choosing its strategy. Suppose the
receiver instead chooses a strategy g˜ as
g˜(i) =

0 i = 0
2 i = 1
2 i = 2
.
Thus the receiver does not naively decode the sender’s
message. It chooses to correctly decode only a subset of
sequences, in this case {0, 2} by applying an identity map
on {0, 2}. For the sequence 1, the receiver decodes it to
the sequence 2.
It can be observed that the best response set of the
sender B(g˜) consists of a single strategy s˜, where
s˜(i) =

0 i = 0
2 i = 1
2 i = 2
.
This gives D(g˜, s˜) = {0, 2} and hence
min
s∈B(g˜)
|D(g˜, s)| = 2.
6Thus, a more sophisticated choice of strategy g˜ improves
on the naive strategy g. The difference between the strate-
gies g and g˜ is that in the latter, the receiver deliberately
induces an error when it receives a sequence 1 from the
sender. Since 1 is not in range of g˜, sender has only {0, 2}
as its choices. Given these choices, the sender is forced to
report 0 as 0. This is because, the sender does not prefer
2 over 0 since U (2, 0) < U (0, 0). Thus, the strategy g˜
limits the choices of the sender and forces it to be truthful
for the sequences {0, 2}.
The decoded set achieved by the strategy g˜ can also be
achieved by the following strategy
ĝ(i) =

0 i = 0
∆ i = 1
2 i = 2
.
Again, 1 is not in the range of ĝ. Thus, the optimal
strategy for the sender is s˜. 
The above example illustrates the gameplay – the order
of play and the possibility of multiple best responses for
the sender. From the above example it is evident that the
receiver has to strategize in order to extract information
from the sender. In general, the receiver may be able to
extract only a subset of the information from the sender.
We formalize and study the observations made in this
example later in the paper.
C. Noisy channel model
Consider now a setting where the sender and receiver
communicate via a noisy channel. As earlier, the sender
observes a sequence X ∈ X n and encodes it as sn(X) =
Y , where sn : X n → X n. However, the message is
now transmitted to the receiver via a discrete memoryless
channel which generates an output Z ∈ X n according to
the distribution PZ|Y defined as
PZ|Y (z|y) =
n∏
i=1
PZ|Y(zi|yi), (5)
where PZ|Y(·|·) ∈ P(X|Y). The output is decoded by the
receiver as gn(Z) = X̂, where gn : X n → X n ∪∆. Here
Z is distributed according to PZ|Y (·|sn(x)), when sn(x)
is the input to the channel.
Let
D(gn, sn) :=
{
x ∈ X n | P(X̂ = x|X = x) = 1
}
, (6)
be the sequence of perfectly recovered sequences when
the receiver plays the strategy gn and the sender plays
the strategy sn. The receiver tries to maximize the size of
this set by choosing a strategy gn. Recall that D(gn, sn)
denoted the set of perfectly decoded sequences in the
noiseless case as well. Although we use the same notation
for the noisy case, its usage will be clear from the context.
The sender on the other hand chooses a strategy sn
to maximize the expected utility E
[
Un(X̂, x)
]
for every
x ∈ X n. The utility Un is as given in (2).
As in the noiseless model, we pose the problem as a
Stackelberg game.
Definition 2.2 (Stackelberg equilibrium): The optimal
strategy of the receiver is given as
g∗n ∈ argmaxgn minsn∈B(gn) |D(gn, sn)|. (7)
The best response set of the sender B(gn) is determined
as
B(gn) =
{
sn : X n → X n |
E
[
Un(gn(Z), x)
]
≥ E
[
Un(gn(Z
′), x)
]
∀ x ∈ X n,∀ s′n
}
, (8)
where Z is distributed according to PZ|Y (·|sn(x)) and Z ′
is distributed according to PZ|Y (·|s′n(x)).
Thus, the best response set of the sender for a strategy
gn of the receiver is a collection of strategies, sn, such
that, when the observed sequence is x, the expected utility
with respect to the distribution PZ|Y (·|sn(x)), is at least
the expected utility obtained with any other distribution
PZ|Y (·|s′n(x)). Notice that, again, as in the noiseless
channel model, we adopt a pessimistic formulation for
the receiver.
Example 2.2. Let n = 1 and let X = {0, 1, 2}. Consider
the utility U given in the Example 2.1. Further, consider
a channel PZ|Y defined as
PZ|Y (0|0) = 1/2, PZ|Y (1|0) = 1/2, PZ|Y (2|0) = 0,
PZ|Y (0|1) = 1/2, PZ|Y (1|1) = 1/2, PZ|Y (2|1) = 0,
PZ|Y (0|2) = 0, PZ|Y (1|2) = 0, PZ|Y (2|2) = 1.
(9)
Suppose the receiver chooses a strategy g : X → X∪∆
as
g(i) =

0 i = 0
0 i = 1
2 i = 2
.
The sender chooses the best response to this strategy as
follows. Suppose the sender observes the sequence 0.
For any strategy s : X → X , the channel output Z is
distributed according to PZ|Y=s(0). Thus, we have
E
[
U (g(Z), 0)
]
=
∑
z
PZ|Y (z|s(0))U (g(z), 0).
It can be observed that if s(0) = 0 or s(0) = 1, then
E
[
U (g(Z), 0)
]
= U (0, 0). Further, if s(0) = 2, then
E
[
U (g(Z), 0)
]
= U (2, 0). Thus
E
[
U (g(Z), 0)
]
≤ max {U (0, 0),U (2, 0)}
7= U (0, 0).
Thus, the best response of the sender is such that s(0) = 0
or s(0) = 1. This gives E[U (g(Z), 0)] = U (0, 0). We
can similarly repeat this calculation for other symbols and
show that the best response set B(g) consists of strategies
s¯, ŝ, where
s¯(i) =

0 i = 0
2 i = 1
2 i = 2
, ŝ(i) =

1 i = 0
2 i = 1
2 i = 2
.
It can be observed that for all s ∈ B(g), we have
D(g, s) = {0, 2}.
This is same as the largest set of perfectly recovered
sequences as discussed in Example 2.1. Thus, even in
the presence of a noisy channel, the receiver can avoid
loss of information by appropriately choosing a decoding
strategy.
We can understand this as follows. From the channel
given in (9), we see that the set of inputs {0, 2} cannot
be confused between each other from the output of the
channel. This is because
supp
(
PZ|Y=0
)⋂
supp
(
PZ|Y=2
)
= ∅.
Similarly, {1, 2} are also distinguishable from each other.
Thus, when the maximum number of distinguishable in-
puts of the channel are large enough, then the receiver can
recover the maximum possible number of sequences from
the sender. In this case, the number of distinguishable
inputs have to be at least 2 since this is the maximum
amount of information that can be extracted from the
sender.
However, this may not be always true. Suppose the
channel is such that
PZ|Y (i|1) =

0 i = 0
1/2 i = 1
1/2 i = 2
.
For inputs {0, 2}, the channel law is same as (9). We see
that all three inputs of the channel can be confused from
the output of the channel since
supp
(
PZ|Y=0
)⋂
supp
(
PZ|Y=1
)⋂
supp
(
PZ|Y=2
)
= {1}.
Thus, in this case, the receiver can only recover one
sequence from the sender, i.e.,
max
g
min
s∈B(g)
|D(g, s)| = 1.

The above example demonstrates how the receiver may
choose its strategy in the presence of a noisy channel.
Moreover, the presence of a noisy channel could possibly
reduce the amount of information that can be extracted
from the sender. We formalize and study these observa-
tions later in the paper.
D. Definitions of graphs
In this section, we introduce some notions of graphs
which will be used to quantify the amount of information
that can be extracted from the sender. First, we define the
sender graph which is a graph induced by the utility of
the sender on the space of sequences X n.
Definition 2.3 (Sender graph): The sender graph, de-
noted as Gn
s
= (X n, E), is the graph where (x, y) ∈ E
if either
Un(x, x) ≤ Un(y, x) or Un(y, y) ≤ Un(x, y).
For n = 1, the graph G1
s
is denoted as Gs and referred
to as the base graph.
Thus, there exists an edge between two vertices x and
y in Gs if the sender has an incentive to report one
sequence as the other. For instance, with the utility defined
in Example 2.1, the sender prefers the symbol 1 over 0
and the symbol 2 over 1. Thus, the graph Gs induced on
X = {0, 1, 2} is a path 0 − 1 − 2 since (0, 1) ∈ Es and
(1, 2) ∈ Es.
Remark: Two utility functions inducing the same graph
on X can induce two different sequences of graphs Gn
s
on X n for n > 1. Let X = {0, 1, 2} and consider the
utility U defined in Example 2.1. As discussed above,
the graph Gs induced on X by U is a path 0 − 1 − 2.
Now consider a utility function U ′ defined as follows.
U ′(0, 0) = 1, U ′(1, 0) = 2, U ′(2, 0) = 0.5,
U ′(0, 1) = 0.5, U ′(1, 1) = 2, U ′(2, 1) = 2,
U ′(0, 2) = 0.5, U ′(1, 2) = 1, U ′(2, 2) = 2.
We can observe that there is an edge between 0 and
1 since U ′(0, 0) < U ′(1, 0) and between 1 and 2 since
U ′(1, 1) = U ′(2, 1). Further there is no edge between
0 and 2 because U ′(0, 0) > U ′(2, 0) and U ′(2, 2) >
U ′(1, 2). Thus, the graph G′
s
induced by U ′ is also a
path 0− 1− 2.
Now take n = 2 and consider the graphs G2
s
and G′2
s
induced by U2 and U
′
2 respectively. Consider two vertices
01 and 10. We have
U2(01, 01) −U2(10, 01)
=
1
2
(U (0, 0) −U (1, 0)) + 1
2
(U (1, 1) −U (0, 1))
=
1
2
(−1 + 1) = 0.
Thus, 01 and 10 have an edge in the graph G2
s
. But
U
′
2 (01, 01) −U ′2 (10, 01) =
1
2
(−1 + 1.5) > 0.
8Similarly, we can show U ′2 (10, 10) > U
′
2 (01, 10) and
hence 01 and 10 are not adjacent in the graph G′2
s
. Thus,
we see that although Gs and G
′
s
are same, G2
s
and G′2
s
are
different. The main lesson is that the graph Gn
s
is defined
by U rather than Gs alone. 
Next, consider a graph on the space of inputs X n
induced by the channel called as the confusability graph.
Definition 2.4 (Confusability graph): The confusability
graph, denoted as Gn
c
= (X n, Ec), is the graph where
(y, y′) ∈ Ec if there exists an output z ∈ X n such that
PZ|Y (z|y)PZ|Y (z|y′) > 0.
For n = 1, the graph G1
c
is denoted as Gc.
Thus, two inputs to the channel have an edge if they
have a common output. The confusability graph was first
introduced Shannon in [15].
The above sender graph and confusability graphs were
induced by the utility Un and the channel PZ|Y respec-
tively. Now consider graphs which are constructed from
a base graph using the notion of a graph product.
Definition 2.5: 1) Cartesian product: Let G1 =
(V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) be two graphs. Then, the
cartesian product of the graphs G1, G2 is given by a graph
G = (V,E) where V = V1 × V2. Further, two vertices
(x, x′), (y, y′) ∈ V , with x, y ∈ V1 and x′, y′ ∈ V2, are
connected with an edge if and only if one of the following
holds
• x = y and x′ ∼ y′
• x ∼ y and x′ = y′
The cartesian product operation is denoted as  and the
product graph G is written as G = G1 G2.
2) Cartesian product graph: The cartesian product
graph denoted as Gn is the graph constructed by taking
n-fold cartesian product of the graph G, i.e.,
Gn = G  G  . . . G︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
Another notion of a graph product is the strong product
which allows for more edges than the Cartesian product.
Definition 2.6: 1) Strong product: Let G1 = (V1, E1)
and G2 = (V2, E2) be two graphs. Then the strong prod-
uct of the graphs G1, G2 is given by a graph G = (V,E)
where V = V1×V2. Further, two vertices (x, x′), (y, y′) ∈
V , with x, y ∈ V1 and x′, y′ ∈ V2, are connected with an
edge if and only if one of the following holds
• x = y and x′ ∼ y′
• x ∼ y and x′ = y′
• x ∼ y and x′ ∼ y′
The strong product operation is denoted as ⊠ and the
product graph G is written as G = G1 ⊠G2.
2) Strong product graph: The strong product graph
denoted as G⊠n is the graph constructed by taking n-fold
strong product of the graph G, i.e.,
G⊠n = G⊠G⊠ . . .⊠G︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
For completeness, we give the following definition of a
subgraph.
Definition 2.7 (Subgraph): A graph G1 = (V1, E1) is a
subgraph of G = (V,E) if V1 ⊆ V and E1 ⊆ E.
A cycle graph is defined as follows.
Definition 2.8 (Cycle graph): A graph G with
{0, 1, . . . , q−1} as the vertex set is called a q-cycle graph
if two vertices i, j are connected with an edge if and only
if j = (i+ 1)mod q.
A special kind of cycle graph called directed cycle is
given as follows.
Definition 2.9 (Directed cycle): A set of k symbols
(x0, . . . , xk−1) ∈ X form a directed cycle if for all
i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
U (xi, xi) ≤ U (xj, xi) for j = (i+ 1)mod k.
We call this graph a directed cycle because for any xi the
sender prefers xj where the index j goes in a particular
direction, i.e., j = (i+ 1)mod k.
III. INFORMATION EXTRACTION FROM THE SENDER
IN EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we determine the size of the set of
perfectly recovered sequences in an equilibrium. We also
determine rate of growth this set with the blocklength n.
Recall that D(gn, sn), defined in (1), is the set of
perfectly recovered sequences when the receiver plays gn
and the sender plays sn. In the Stackelberg game, when
the receiver plays the strategy gn, the number of per-
fectly recovered sequences are minsn∈B(gn) |D(gn, sn)|.
To determine how this number grows with n, consider
the following rate of information extraction for a strategy
gn.
Definition 3.1 (Rate of information extraction for a
strategy): For any strategy gn of the receiver, the rate
of information extraction is defined as
R(gn) = min
sn∈B(gn)
|D(gn, sn)|1/n.
Thus, when the receiver plays the strategy gn, R(gn)
captures the rate of growth of the number of perfectly
recovered sequences as a function of blocklength n. We
now determine this rate in a Stackelberg equilibrium of
the game. For that, we first characterize R(gn) for any
strategy gn of the receiver.
9A. Characterizing R(gn)
The tendency of the sender to misreport its information
is captured by the utility function Un and the corre-
sponding sender graph Gn
s
. We now deduce a relation
between Gn
s
and the Stackelberg equilibrium given in
Definition 2.1 by showing that in the equilibrium, the
receiver can perfectly recover only an independent set of
the graph Gn
s
.
Lemma 3.1: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with utility
U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph. For any
strategy gn define
S (gn) = arg min
sn∈B(gn)
|D(gn, sn)|.
Then, for all strategies sn ∈ S (gn), D(gn, sn) is an
independent set in Gn
s
.
Proof : For strategies gn such that
minsn∈S (gn) |D(gn, sn)| ≤ 1, the claim trivially holds.
Let gn be such that |D(gn, sn)| ≥ 2 for all strategies
sn ∈ S (gn). We prove the claim by contradiction.
Suppose for some strategy sn ∈ S (gn), the set
D(gn, sn) is not an independent set in Gns . Thus, there
exists distinct sequences x¯, x̂ ∈ D(gn, sn) such that
Un(x¯, x¯) ≤ Un(x̂, x¯). Using this, we define a strategy
s¯n as
s¯n(x) =
{
sn(x) ∀ x 6= x¯
sn(x̂) for x = x¯
. (10)
Observe that s¯n is also a best response since
Un(gn ◦ s¯n(x), x) = Un(gn ◦ sn(x), x) ∀ x 6= x¯
and for x = x¯,
Un(gn ◦ s¯n(x¯), x¯) = Un(gn ◦ sn(x̂), x¯)
= Un(x̂, x¯) (11)
≥ Un(x¯, x¯) = Un(gn ◦ sn(x¯), x¯).
Here (11) follows since gn ◦ sn(x̂) = x̂, which in turn
holds since x̂ ∈ D(gn, sn).
Now, for all x ∈ D(gn, sn)\{x¯}, we have gn ◦ s¯n(x) =
gn ◦ sn(x) = x and hence x lies in D(gn, s¯n) and
D(gn, sn). However, when x = x¯, we have gn ◦ s¯n(x¯) =
x̂ 6= x¯ = gn◦sn(x¯). Thus, the sequence x¯ lies in D(gn, sn)
but is not recovered by the pair (gn, s¯n) and hence does
not lie in D(gn, s¯n). Thus,
|D(gn, s¯n)| < |D(gn, sn)|.
However, this is a contradiction since sn ∈ S (gn). Thus
for all sn ∈ S (gn), the set D(gn, sn) is an independent
set in Gn
s
.
Thus, for any choice of strategy gn of the receiver, the
set of perfectly decoded set is an independent set in the
graph Gn
s
. In the next lemma, we show that choosing
an appropriate strategy gn, the receiver can recover any
independent set of Gn
s
.
Lemma 3.2: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with
utility U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph.
Consider an independent set In in G
n
s
and define the
strategy gn for the receiver as
gn(x) =
{
x if x ∈ In
∆ if x /∈ In . (12)
Then, for all sn ∈ B(gn),
D(gn, sn) = In.
Proof : Since ∆ is never preferred by the sender, we can
assume without loss of generality, that for all sn ∈ B(gn)
and for all x, gn ◦ sn(x) ∈ In and hence D(gn, sn) ⊆ In.
We will now show In ⊆ D(gn, sn) for all sn ∈ B(gn).
Consider an x ∈ In. For any sn ∈ B(gn), the utility
of the sender is
Un(gn ◦ sn(x), x) = Un(x′, x)
for some x′ ∈ In. Since, In is an independent set in Gns ,
we have Un(x
′, x) < Un(x, x) for all x
′ ∈ In, x′ 6= x.
Since x ∈ In was arbitrary, we have
Un(gn ◦ sn(x), x) ≤ Un(x, x) ∀ x ∈ In,
with equality if and only if gn ◦ sn(x) = x. Clearly, the
optimal choice of sn for the sender, is such that sn(x) = x
for all x ∈ In. In particular, all the strategies sn ∈ B(gn)
are such that sn(x) = x for all x ∈ In. Thus, for all
sn ∈ B(gn), In ⊆ D(gn, sn).
Thus, we see that the receiver can extract information
from the sender by appropriately choosing its decoding
strategy. In particular, from the strategy defined in (12),
we see that the receiver decodes meaningfully only for a
subset of sequences. It chooses an independent set In of
Gn
s
and correctly decodes messages which belong to this
set. For the rest of the messages, the receiver declares an
error ∆. Then, the optimal strategy for the sender is such
that it reports the sequences in the set In truthfully. Note
that in the above proof we do not discuss the strategy
of the sender for sequences which are not in the set In.
However, it can be said that for all strategies sn ∈ B(gn)
and for all x ∈ X n, sn(x) lies in In. This is because for
any other sn(x) /∈ In, gn(sn(x)) = ∆, which leads to
least possible utility.
B. Characterizing R(gn) in a Stackelberg equilibrium
We now characterize the rate on information extraction
for a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy g∗n of the receiver.
We show this by proving that in a Stackelberg equilib-
rium, the receiver can recover any largest independent set
of the graph Gn
s
.
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Theorem 3.3: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with utility
U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph. For all
Stackelberg equilibrium strategies g∗n of the receiver, we
have
R(g∗n) = α(G
n
s
)1/n.
Proof : From Lemma 3.1, we have for all gn, the perfectly
decoded set is an independent set in Gn
s
. Further, from
Lemma 3.2, we have for any independent set In in
Gn
s
, there exists a strategy gn of the receiver such that
D(gn, sn) = In for all sn ∈ B(gn). Thus, we have
max
gn
R(gn) = max
gn
min
sn∈B(gn)
|D(gn, sn)|1/n
= max
In∈Gns
|In|1/n.
The maximization is over all independent sets in Gn
s
.
Since, maxIn∈Gns |In| = α(Gns ), we have the result.
Thus, we see that the maximum information the re-
ceiver can extract from the sender is equal to the inde-
pendence number of Gn
s
and the rate is given by the nth
root of this independence number. This motivates a notion
of the information extraction capacity of the sender which
we discuss in the following section.
IV. INFORMATION EXTRACTION CAPACITY OF THE
SENDER
In our setting, although the channel is noiseless, the
sender is strategic and hence the information received by
the receiver may not be correct. This suggests existence of
a limit to the amount of information that can be extracted
from the sender. In the earlier section we observed that by
a suitable choice of strategy gn the receiver can perfectly
recover any largest independent set of Gn
s
(and no more)
from the sender. Consequently, it is natural to ask the
following question – how does the size of this set grow
with n? For this, we define a notion of information
extraction capacity of a sender.
Definition 4.1 (Information extraction capacity of a
sender): Consider a sender with utility U and let
{Gn
s
}n≥1 be the corresponding sequence of sender graphs.
The information extraction capacity of the sender is
defined as
Ξ(U ) = lim
n
α(Gn
s
)1/n.
We can observe, thanks to Theorem 3.3, that if the
above quantity is greater than unity, then as n grows
large, the receiver can extract exponentially (in n) large
number of sequences from the sender when the channel
is noiseless. In the following section we will show that
the limit in Definition 4.1 exists.
Our definition of the information extraction capacity is
inspired by the definition of the Shannon capacity of a
graph as given in [16].
Definition 4.2 (Shannon capacity): Let G be any graph.
The Shannon capacity of G is defined as
Θ(G) = lim
n
α(G⊠n)1/n,
where G⊠n is given by Definition 2.6.
The notion of the capacity of a graph G was introduced
by Shannon in [15]. Shannon investigated the problem
of computing the maximum number of messages that
can be transmitted across a noisy channel such that the
receiver can recover the messages with zero probability
of error. He introduced the notion of the confusability
graph G induced by this channel and showed that for
any blocklength n, α(G⊠n) is the maximum number of
messages that can be communicated perfectly across the
channel. The limit of the quantity (logα(G⊠n))/n was
termed as the zero-error capacity of the channel. The
zero-error capacity, also called the Shannon capacity of
the graph G, is equivalently given by Definition 4.2.
A. Preliminary results on the information extraction ca-
pacity
We first show the existence of the limit in Defini-
tion 4.1. Recall the following lemma due to Fekete.
Lemma 4.1 (Fekete’s lemma [17]): For any real valued
sequence {an}n≥1 with am+n ≥ am+an, the limit of the
sequence {an/n}n≥1 exists and is equal to supn an/n.
The following lemma shows submultiplicative property of
α(Gn
s
) which will be used to prove existence of the limit
in Definition 4.1.
Lemma 4.2: For any sender graph Gn
s
,
α(Gm+n
s
) ≥ α(Gm
s
)α(Gn
s
) ∀ m,n ∈ N.
Proof : Consider an independent set Im in G
m
s
with
|Im| = α(Gms ) and an independent set In in Gns , with
|In| = α(Gns ). Clearly, Im × In ⊆ Xm+n. We show that
Im × In is an independent set in Gm+ns .
Consider sequences x, y ∈ Xm+n such that x =
(wm, wn), y = (vm, vn), where wm, vm ∈ Im and
wn, vn ∈ In, with wk := (x1, . . . , xk) and vk :=
(y1, . . . , yk) for all k. Now,
Um+n(x, x)−Um+n(y, x)
=
m
m+ n
(Um(w
m, wm)−Um(vm, wm))
+
n
m+ n
(Un(w
n, wn)−Un(vn, wn)).
Since Im and In are independent sets, we
have Um(w
m, wm) > Um(v
m, wm) and
Un(w
n, wn) > Un(v
n, wn). Thus, we get
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Um+n(x, x) > Um+n(y, x). This holds for all sequences
x, y ∈ Im × In and hence Im × In is an independent set
in Gm+n
s
. Thus, α(Gm+n
s
) ≥ |Im||In| = α(Gms )α(Gns ).
Using this lemma, the existence of the limit in Defini-
tion 4.1 is proved as follows.
Lemma 4.3: Consider a sender with utility U and the
corresponding sequence of sender graphs {Gn
s
}n≥1. The
limit given in Definition 4.1 exists.
Proof : From Lemma 4.2, we have α(Gm+n
s
) ≥
α(Gm
s
)α(Gn
s
), for allm,n ∈ N. Define βn = log(α(Gns ))
to get βm+n ≥ βm + βm. From Fekete’s lemma, the
limit of the sequence {bn/n}n≥1 exists and is equal
to supn βn/n. Using this and from the continuity and
monotonicity of exp(.), we get
lim
n
exp
(
βn
n
)
= sup
n
exp
(
βn
n
)
.
Substituting βn = log(α(G
n
s
)), we get the required result.
This proves the existence of the information extraction
capacity. The following bounds are an immediate conse-
quence of Lemma 4.2.
Proposition 4.4: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. The information
extraction capacity of the sender satisfies
α(Gs) ≤ Ξ(U ) ≤ q.
Proof : Using Lemma 4.2, we get α(Gn
s
) ≥ α(Gs)n for all
n. Further, the independence number α(Gn
s
) is bounded
above by qn. Thus, we have
α(Gs) ≤ α(Gns )1/n ≤ q.
Taking limit on both sides, we get the result.
The lower bound shows that the capacity is greater than
unity for anyGs that is not a complete graph. Remarkably,
as we discuss in the following sections, the capacity can
be greater than unity even whenGs is a complete graph. In
fact, under certain conditions, we show that the capacity
of a complete graph can be equal to q (refer Section IV-C).
Although non-intuitive, this holds because the structure of
the graph Gn
s
is a function of the utility. Thus, two utility
function generating the same Gs could lead to dissimilar
sequences of graphs Gn
s
.
Notice also that the bounds in the above result are a
function of Gs, whereas the information extraction capac-
ity is a function of the utility U . As one might expect,
neither of these bounds are tight. In the following sections,
we discuss the conditions under which the information
extraction capacity of a sender can be equal to q, cases
when the capacity is strictly less than q, and when equal
to α(Gs).
B. When is Ξ(U ) = q?
In the last section, we showed that the theoretical
maximum of Ξ(U ) is q. Intuitively, Ξ(U ) = q implies
that the sender is “nearly” truthful since for large n,
the receiver can recover approximately qn number of
sequences from the sender. In this section, we give a
sufficient condition for Ξ(U ) = q. This condition is in
terms of the optimal value of a linear program. We also
discuss some examples and pertaining to our results.
To define the linear program, consider the matrix U ∈
Rq×q where the entries U [i, j] are given as
U [i, j] = U (i, i) −U (j, i) ∀ i, j ∈ X .
Further, let Q ⊆ {0, 1}q×q be the set of permutation
matrices. We write the matrices in Q as (Q(1), . . . , Q(|Q|))
with Q(0) = I where I is the q × q identity matrix. The
linear program is given as follows.
LP : min
α,W
1
q
∑
i,j
U [i, j]W [i, j]
s.t
W =
∑|Q|
k=1 αkQ
(k)∑|Q|
k=1 αk = 1
α ∈ [0, 1]|Q|.
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition in
terms of the optimal value of this LP for Ξ(U ) = q.
Theorem 4.5: Consider a sender with utility U and let
{Gn
s
}n≥1 be the corresponding sequence of sender graphs.
If OPT(LP ) > 0, then
Ξ(U ) = q.
Notice that the LP is independent of the blocklength n
and thus the positivity of OPT(LP ) is a single-letter
condition. Further, this optimal value can be computed
with efficient algorithms. On the other hand, computing
the Ξ(U ) requires the information of the sequence of
{α(Gn
s
)}n≥1 corresponding to the sequence of sender
graphs {Gn
s
}n≥1 induced by U . Moreover, the com-
putation independence number of a generic graph can
be intractable. Thus, in this light, the above theorem
provides a computationally efficient condition to check
for Ξ(U ) = q.
We now proceed to prove this theorem. First, we show
that if a “large” subset of X n is an independent set in
Gn
s
, then we have Ξ(U ) = q. For that, we require the
following definition of a type class.
Definition 4.3: Let K ∈ N, be such that Kq ∈ N.
Define TKq1/q as the type class given by
TKq1/q =
{
x ∈ XKq | |{i : xi = a}| = K ∀ a ∈ X
}
.
The following lemma computes the limit of |TKq1/q |1/Kq as
K →∞.
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Lemma 4.6: Consider a sequence of {TKq1/q }Kq∈N. Then,
limK→∞ |TKq1/q |1/Kq = q.
Proof : From Stirling’s approximation, we have
|TKq1/q | ∼
qKq+1/2
(2piK)
q−1
2
.
Taking the Kqth root and letting K → ∞, we get
|TKq1/q |1/Kq → q.
The above lemma shows that the set TKq1/q occupies a
significant proportion of the space of sequences XKq as
K grows large. This suggests that to achieve Ξ(U ) = q,
it suffices to perfectly recover the set TKq1/q . We know that
from Lemma 3.2, TKq1/q can be recovered perfectly by the
receiver if it is an independent set in GKqs . The following
lemma formalizes this proposition.
Lemma 4.7: Consider a sender with utility U and let
{Gn
s
}n≥1 be the corresponding sequence of sender graphs.
Assume that for all Kq ∈ N, TKq1/q is an independent set
in GKqs . Then, Ξ(U ) = q.
Proof : Since Ξ(U ) = limn α(G
n
s
), it suffices to show
that there exists a sequence of independent sets In in G
n
s
,
such that limn |In|1/n = q.
Let n ∈ N. Define In as
In = T
Kq
1/q × In−Kq.
where K ∈ N is largest integer such that Kq ≤ n and
In−Kq is the largest independent set in G
n−Kq
s . We now
show that In is an independent set inG
n
s
. Consider distinct
sequences x, y ∈ In as x = (v, v′) and y = (w,w′) with
v,w ∈ TKq1/q and v′, w′ ∈ In−Kq. We can write
Un(x, x)−Un(y, x)
=
1
n
(
Kq
(
UKq(v, v) −UKq(w, v)
)
+ (n −Kq)(Un−Kq(v′, v′)−Un−Kq(w′, v′))).
Since TKq
1/q
and In−Kq are independent sets in G
Kq
s
and Gn−Kqs , we get UKq(v, v) > UKq(w, v) and
Un−Kq(v
′, v′) > Un−Kq(w
′, v′). Thus, Un(x, x) >
Un(y, x) for all distinct sequences x, y ∈ In.
Now α(Gn
s
) ≥ |In| = |TKq1/q ||In−Kq|. Thus, we get
lim
n
α(Gn
s
)1/n ≥ lim sup
n
|TKq1/q |1/n|In−Kq|1/n.
Using Lemma 4.2, |In−Kq|1/n is bounded as
|In−Kq|1/n = α(Gn−Kqs )1/n ≥ α(Gs)(n−Kq)/n.
Since n = Kq + n′ and n′/n → 0, we get
α(Gs)
(n−Kq)/n → 1. Further, Kq/n → 1 and
hence |TKq1/q |1/n → q from Lemma 4.6. Thus,
limn α(G
n
s
)1/n = q, whereby Ξ(U ) = q.
Thus, it suffices that TKq
1/q
is an independent set in GKqs
for all K to achieve Ξ(U ) = q. For TKq1/q to be an inde-
pendent set in GKqs , we require UKq(x, x) > UKq(y, x)
for all distinct x, y ∈ TKq1/q . We will now derive a result
that gives a succinct condition in terms of the LP for this
to hold.
Proposition 4.8: Let n = Kq,K ∈ N. Consider a
sender with utility U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding
sender graph. Then, T n1/q is an independent set in G
n
s
if
and only if OPT(LP ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.8 proceeds in two steps. First,
note the following lemma.
Lemma 4.9: For all x, x′ ∈ TKq1/q , we have
min
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x)
= min
y′∈TKq1/q\{x
′}
UKq(x
′, x′)−UKq(y′, x′).
Proof : Consider any x, x′ ∈ TKq1/q . Then, there exists a
permutation Π : {1, . . . ,Kq} → {1, . . . ,Kq}, such that
x′i = xΠ(i) and hence UKq(x, x) = UKq(x
′, x′). Thus, to
prove the result, it suffices to show
max
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
UKq(y, x) = max
y′∈TKq1/q\{x
′}
UKq(y
′, x′).
Using x′i = xΠ(i), we write
max
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
UKq(y, x) = max
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
∑
i
U (yi, xi)
= max
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
∑
i
U (yΠ(i), xΠ(i))
= max
y∈TKq1/q\{x
′}
∑
i
U (yΠ(i), x
′
i).
Taking y′i = yΠ(i), we write the above expression as
max
y′∈TKq1/q\{x
′}
∑
i
U (y′i, x
′
i) = max
y′∈TKq1/q\{x
′}
UKq(y
′, x′).
The above lemma shows that the minimum value of the
difference UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x) over y ∈ TKq1/q \ {x} is
the same for all x. Thus, to check for independence of
TKq1/q in G
n
s
, it suffices to fix an x ∈ TKq1/q and compute
the minimum of the difference UKq(x, x) −UKq(y, x).
In the following lemma, we show that this value is
also constant over all K. In particular, this value is the
optimal value of the LP . The idea of the proof is as
follows. The set TKq1/q has a special structure since all
elements of TKq1/q are permutations of each other. Thus,
given x, y ∈ TKq1/q , y 6= x, we can associate a unique
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permutation matrix in Q, which is not an identity matrix,
such that the difference U (x, x) − U (y, x) of utilities
is equal to the objective value of the LP . Further, we
can show that the optimal of the LP is attained by a
W which is a permutation matrix in Q \ I . Thus, there
is no gap between the optimal value of the LP and
the difference given in Lemma 4.9, whereby computing
the optimal value of LP is equivalent to computing the
minimum value of the difference U (x, x)−U (y, x) over
y ∈ TKq1/q \ {x}.
Lemma 4.10: For all Kq ∈ N and x ∈ TKq1/q ,
min
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x) = OPT(LP ).
Proof : Let x ∈ TKq1/q be arbitrary and let y ∈ TKq1/q , y 6= x
be given. We define a feasible W such that
1
q
∑
i,j∈X
U [i, j]W [i, j] = UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x).
First consider a W ′ ∈ [0, 1]q×q as follows.
W ′[i, j] =
1
K
|{l | (xl, yl) = (i, j)}|. (13)
The sum of rows of W ′ is∑
i
W ′[i, j] =
1
K
∑
i
|{l | (xl, yl) = (i, j)}|
=
1
K
|{l | yl = j}| = 1 ∀ j ∈ X .
Similarly,
∑
j W
′[i, j] = 1 for all i. Thus, W ′ lies in
[0, 1]q×q and is a doubly stochastic matrix. Further,
1
q
∑
i,j
U [i, j]W ′[i, j]
=
1
Kq
∑
i,j
U [i, j]
Kq∑
l=1
I{(xl, yl) = (i, j)}
=
1
Kq
Kq∑
l=1
U (xl, xl)−U (yl, xl)
= UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x). (14)
However, W ′ may not be feasible for the LP . We now
construct a feasible matrix such that the objective value
is same as the above value. The set of doubly stochastic
matrices is the convex hull of the set of q×q permutation
matrices (Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, [17]). Thus,
W ′ can be written as
W ′ = α1I +W, W =
|Q|∑
k>1
αkQ
(k),
where Q(k) ∈ Q\I and∑k αk = 1. Using this, we write∑
i,j
U [i, j]W ′[i, j]
=
∑
i,j
α1U [i, j]I[i, j] +
|Q|∑
k>1
∑
i,j
αkU [i, j]Q
(k)[i, j]
=
∑
i,j
U [i, j]W [i, j],
where the last equality follows since
∑
i,j U [i, j]I[i, j] =
0. Notice that W is feasible for the LP . Moreover, from
(14) and using the above equality, we have
1
q
∑
i,j
U [i, j]W [i, j] =
1
q
∑
i,j
U [i, j]W ′[i, j]
= UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x).
Thus,
OPT(LP ) ≤ min
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x).
We conclude the proof by showing that this lower
bound is achieved by some y ∈ TKq1/q \ {x}. Consider
the LP , written as
LP : min
α
1
q
|Q|−1∑
k=1
αk
∑
i,j
U [i, j]Q(k)[i, j]

s.t
∑|Q|−1
k=1 αk = 1
αk ∈ [0, 1].
From the fundamental theorem of linear programming,
the optimal of LP occurs at an α∗ ∈ [0, 1]|Q|−1 where
α∗k = 1 for some k ∈ {1, . . . , |Q|− 1}. Thus, the optimal
W ∗ = Q(k) is a permutation matrix in Q \ I .
Consider a y ∈ TKq1/q \ {x} defined as follows. For all
i, j ∈ X ,
yl = j if and only if xl = i andW
∗[i, j] = 1.
Thus, for every j there exists an i such that
{l | yl = j} = {l | xl = i}
and since |{l | xl = i}| = K for all i, we get that y ∈
TKq1/q . Also,W
∗ is not an identity matrix and hence y 6= x.
Thus,
q
(
Kq∑
l=1
U (xl, xl)−U (yl, xl)
)
=
1
K
Kq∑
l=1
∑
i,j
(U (i, i) −U (j, i)) I{(xl, yl) = (i, j)}
=
1
K
∑
i,j
(U (i, i) −U (j, i)) |{l | (xl, yl) = (i, j)}|
=
∑
i,j
U [i, j]W ∗[i, j],
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where the last inequality follows by using |{l | (xl, yl) =
(i, j)}| = KW ∗[i, j]. This gives
min
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x) = OPT(LP ).
Since x ∈ TKq1/q was arbitrary, the result follows by using
Lemma 4.9.
Thus we have the proof of Proposition 4.8, stated below
for completeness.
Proof of Proposition 4.8: Let TKq1/q be an independent set
in GKqs . Thus, for all distinct sequences x, y ∈ TKq1/q , we
have UKq(x, x) > UKq(y, x) and hence
min
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
UKq(x, x)−UKq(y, x) > 0 ∀ x ∈ TKq1/q .
Using Lemma 4.10, we get that OPT(LP ) > 0. Con-
versely, let OPT(LP ) > 0. Then, for all x ∈ TKq1/q and
for all K
min
y∈TKq1/q\{x}
UKq(x, x) −UKq(y, x) = OPT(LP ) > 0
and hence UKq(x, x) > UKq(y, x) for all distinct
sequences x, y ∈ TKq1/q .
We now have the tools to prove Theorem 4.5.
Proof of Theorem 4.5: Since OPT(LP ) > 0, from
Proposition 4.8 we have that TKq1/q is an independent
set in GKqs for all K. From Lemma 4.7, we get that
Ξ(U ) = q.
1) Illustrative examples and counterexamples: In this
section, we discuss certain examples of utility functions
and analyze the corresponding LP ’s.
Recall the definition of directed cycle in Definition 2.9.
For graphs which do not contain a direct cycle, we have
the following theorem which gives a sufficient condition
for the OPT(LP ) to be positive.
Theorem 4.11: Consider a sender with utility U and let
Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Suppose Gs does
not contain a directed cycle. If
min
i,j:U(i,j)>0
U(i, j) > (q − 1) max
i,j:U(i,j)≤0
|U(i, j)|, (15)
then, Ξ(U ) = q.
Proof : From the proof of Lemma 4.10, we observed that
the optimal of LP is attained by a permutation matrix
in Q \ I , I being the identity matrix. Thus, to prove
OPT(LP ) > 0 it suffices to show that for all matrices
W ∈ Q \ I , we have ∑i,j U [i, j]W [i, j] > 0. We prove
this by showing that if Gs does not contain a directed
cycle, then for all W ∈ Q \ I , there exists i, j ∈ X such
that U [i, j]W [i, j] > 0. The result will follow by using
(15).
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose there exists
a matrix W ∈ Q \ I such that for all i, j ∈ X we
have U [i, j]W [i, j] ≤ 0. Now, W defines a permutation
Π : X → X such that Π(i′) 6= i′ for some i′ ∈ X .
Since every permutation map can be decomposed into
finite cycles, there exists k symbols {x0, . . . , xk−1} ⊆ X
such that xj = xΠ(i) where Π(i) := (i+ 1)mod k. Using
U [i, j]W [i, j] ≤ 0 for all i, j ∈ X , we get that whenever
j = (i+ 1)mod k,
U (xi, xi)−U (xj, xi) = U [xi, xj ] ≤ 0.
Thus, {x0, . . . , xk−1} ⊆ X form a directed cycle. How-
ever, this is a contradiction. Hence for all W ∈ Q \ I ,
there exists some i, j such that U [i, j]W [i, j] > 0. This
gives that for all W ∈ Q \ I ,∑
i,j
U [i, j]W [i, j]
=
∑
i,j:U [i,j]W [i,j]>0
U [i, j] +
∑
i,j:U [i,j]W [i,j]≤0
U [i, j]
≥ min
i,j:U [i,j]>0
U [i, j] + (q − 1) max
i,j:U [i,j]≤0
U [i, j]
> 0.
Thus OPT(LP ) > 0.
For graphs Gs which contain a directed cycle, one
can prove the following negative result, showing that
OPT(LP ) is non-positive. Thus, Theorem 4.5 is not
informative for the computation of Ξ(U ) in this case.
Lemma 4.12: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Suppose there
exists a directed cycle in Gs, then OPT(LP ) is non-
positive.
Proof : Proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.11 gives a sufficient condition on U for the
OPT(LP ) to be positive. However, this condition is not
a necessary condition as demonstrated by the following
example.
Example 4.1. Consider the following matrix
U =
 0 −2 24 0 −1
4 4 0
 .
Clearly, mini,j:U [i,j]>0U [i, j] = 2 =
maxi,j:U [i,j]≤0 |U [i, j]|. However, it can be observed
that the optimal value of the LP will be positive. This
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is because the minimum of
∑
i,j U [i, j]Q[i, j], where
Q ∈ Q \ I , occurs at
Q =
 0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0
 ,
which is
∑
i,j U [i, j]Q[i, j] = 1. 
Using Theorem 4.11, the following example shows that
Ξ(U ) can be equal to q even when the base sender graph
Gs is a complete graph.
Example 4.2. Consider the following matrix
U =
 0 −1 −14 0 −1
4 4 0
 .
In the graph Gs there is an edge between (0, 1), (0, 2) and
(1, 2). This follows from U [0, 1] = U (0, 0)−U (1, 0) <
0, U [0, 2] = U (0, 0) − U (2, 0) < 0 and U [1, 2] =
U (1, 1)−U (2, 1) < 0. Thus, Gs is a 3-cycle graph and
hence is a complete graph. Moreover, U [2, 0], U [2, 1] >
0 and hence there does not exist a directed cycle in
the graph. Further, mini,j:U [i,j]>0U [i, j] = 4 > (3 −
1)maxi,j:U [i,j]≤0 |U [i, j]| = 2. Thus, the conditions of
Theorem 4.11 are satisfied and hence OPT(LP ) > 0,
which gives Ξ(U ) = q. 
In this section, we discussed cases when Ξ(U ) = q.
Further, we also discussed cases, where Ξ(U ) may be
less than q. In the following section, we discuss a case
where the capacity is strictly less than q.
C. When is Ξ(U ) < q?
In this section, we discuss a case where Ξ(U ) is strictly
less than q. In fact, Ξ(U ) is bounded above by the
Shannon capacity of the sender graph and hence, using
this result, we exactly characterize Ξ(U ) for a class of
utility functions.
Recall the condition on the utility given by (15). We
can equivalently write the condition in terms of U as
follows.
min
i,j:U (i,i)>U (j,i)
(
U (i, i) −U (j, i))
> (q − 1) max
i,j:U (i,i)≤U (j,i)
∣∣U (i, i) −U (j, i)∣∣. (16)
If Gs does not contain a directed cycle, then (16) is a
sufficient condition on U for Ξ(U ) = q (see Theo-
rem 4.11). This condition suggests that in order to get
a positive value of OPT(LP ), the least gain achieved by
the sender by telling the truth should be higher than the
maximum gain achieved by lying about its sequence. This
condition suggests that if the gain obtained by truth telling
is sufficiently larger than the gain obtained by lying, the
sender has a higher tendency to speak the truth. Hence, a
substantial subset of sequences can be recovered perfectly
by the receiver enabling maximum Ξ(U ).
We now investigate the counter question, i.e., under
what conditions on U , Ξ(U ) is strictly less than q?
Motivated by (16), we consider the following assumption
on U .
Assumption 4.1: Let U be such that U (i, i) 6= U (j, i)
for all i, j ∈ X , i 6= j and
|U (i, i) −U (j, i)| = |U (k, k) −U (l, k)|
∀ i, j, k, l ∈ X , i 6= j, k 6= l.
The above assumption states that all deviations from the
actual observation contribute equally to the gain and loss
of the sender. Thus, the gain obtained by truth telling
is equal to the gain obtained by lying. Clearly, this
assumption on U leads to a more deceitful sender and
consequently, it yields a Ξ(U ) which is strictly lower
than q.
Before arriving at the main result, we first note that with
Assumption 4.1, OPT(LP ) is non-positive. Thereby, we
cannot use Theorem 4.5 to determine Ξ(U ).
Lemma 4.13: Consider a sender with utility U which
satisfies Assumption 4.1. Suppose there exists some i, j ∈
X such that U (i, i) < U (j, i). Then, the optimal value
of the LP is not positive.
Proof : Proof is in the Appendix.
We now prove the main result of this section which
states that Ξ(U ) is bounded above by the Shannon capac-
ity of Gs. The main idea of the proof is in showing that the
strong product graph constructed as G⊠n
s
= Gs⊠ . . .⊠Gs
is a subgraph of Gn
s
. This gives an upper bound on the
independence number of Gn
s
. The capacity result follows
by taking the limit.
One can show the following lemma which will be used
to prove Theorem 4.15.
Lemma 4.14: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with utility
U and let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Let U
satisfy Assumption 4.1. Let G⊠n
s
:= Gs ⊠ . . . ⊠ Gs be
the n-fold strong product of Gs. For all x, y ∈ G⊠ns such
that x ∼ y, if Un(x, x) = Un(y, x), then Un(y, y) ≤
Un(x, y).
Proof : Proof is in the Appendix.
The following theorem shows that Gn
s
contains the n-fold
strong product graph of Gs.
Theorem 4.15: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with
utility U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph.
Define G⊠n
s
:= Gs⊠ . . .⊠Gs as the n-fold strong product
of Gs. If U satisfies Assumption 4.1, then, G
⊠n
s
is a
subgraph of Gn
s
.
Proof : We prove the result by induction.
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Base case: For n = 1 both the graphs are same. Hence,
the statement is trivially true.
Induction hypothesis: Assume
G⊠k
s
⊆ Gk
s
∀ k ≤ n− 1.
Now let x and y be two vertices in G⊠n
s
connected via
an edge. We write x = (wn−1, w), y = (vn−1, v) where
wn−1, vn−1 ∈ X n−1 and w, v ∈ X , with wn−1 :=
(x1, . . . , xn−1) and v
n−1 := (y1, . . . , yn−1). From the
definition of G⊠n
s
, we get the following cases.
Case 1: wn−1 = vn−1 and w ∼ v in Gs
In this case, we have
Un(x, x)−Un(y, x) = 1
n
(U (w,w) −U (v,w)).
Similarly, Un(y, y)−Un(x, y) = 1n(U (v, v)−U (w, v)).
Since w ∼ v, either U (w,w) ≤ U (v,w) or
U (v, v) ≤ U (w, v). Hence, either Un(x, x) ≤ Un(y, x)
or Un(y, y) ≤ Un(x, y). Thus, x ∼ y in Gns .
Case 2: wn−1 ∼ vn−1 in G⊠n
s
and w = v
In this case, we have
Un(x, x)−Un(y, x)
=
n− 1
n
(Un−1(w
n−1, wn−1)−Un−1(vn−1, wn−1))
+
1
n
(U (w,w) −U (v,w))
=
n− 1
n
(Un−1(w
n−1, wn−1)−Un−1(vn−1, wn−1))
and
Un(y, y)−Un(x, y)
=
n− 1
n
(Un−1(v
n−1, vn−1)−Un−1(wn−1, vn−1)).
From the induction hypothesis, we have wn−1 ∼ vn−1 in
Gn−1
s
, which gives x ∼ y in Gn
s
.
Case 3: wn−1 ∼ vn−1 in Gn−1
s
and w ∼ v in Gs
Following the arguments from Case 2, either
Un−1(w
n−1, wn−1) ≤ Un−1(vn−1, wn−1) or
Un−1(v
n−1, vn−1) ≤ Un−1(wn−1, vn−1). With this, we
have the following sub-cases.
Case i: Suppose Un−1(w
n−1, wn−1) <
Un−1(v
n−1, wn−1).
Then from Assumption 4.1, we get Un(x, x) ≤
Un(y, x) and thus, x ∼ y in Gns .
Case ii: Suppose Un−1(w
n−1, wn−1) =
Un−1(v
n−1, wn−1).
Then we have from Lemma 4.14 that
Un−1(v
n−1, vn−1) ≤ Un−1(wn−1, vn−1).
Now if U (w,w) ≤ U (v,w) then, Un(x, x) ≤ Un(y, x).
If not, then we use U (v, v) ≤ U (w, v) to get
Un−1(v
n−1, vn−1) ≤ Un−1(wn−1, vn−1), which gives
that x ∼ y in Gn
s
.
Case iii: Suppose Un−1(w
n−1, wn−1) >
Un−1(v
n−1, wn−1).
Then from Lemma 4.14 and using wn−1 ∼ vn−1, we
get
Un−1(v
n−1, vn−1) < Un−1(w
n−1, vn−1),
and hence Un(y, y) ≤ Un(x, y) which gives that x ∼ y
in Gn
s
.
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.16: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. If U satisfies
Assumption 4.1, then
α(Gs) ≤ Ξ(U ) ≤ Θ(Gs).
Proof : The first inequality was shown in Proposition 4.4.
From Theorem 4.15, G⊠n
s
⊆ Gn
s
for all n. Thus,
α(Gn
s
) ≤ α(G⊠n
s
) and hence α(Gn
s
)1/n ≤ α(G⊠n
s
)1/n.
Taking the limit, we get Ξ(U ) ≤ Θ(Gs).
We find the conclusion of Theorem 4.16 to be non-
trivial since it relates two seemingly disparate quanti-
ties. The Shannon graph capacity problem, also called
the zero-error capacity problem, was first introduced by
Shannon in [15]. It concerns a communication setting
between a sender and receiver, where the receiver wishes
to recover the source sequences without any error over
a noisy channel. This problem differs from our setting
since in our case, the sender may not cooperate with the
receiver. Further, the medium of communication in our
setting is noiseless. Also, the Shannon capacity concerns
the noisy channel, whereas the information extraction
capacity is the property of the sender.
To the best of our knowledge, the information extrac-
tion capacity Ξ(U ) is the first case of a quantity that
lies between the independence number and the Shan-
non capacity. The Shannon graph capacity problem has
been extensively studied [18]. However, computing the
Shannon capacity for graphs as small as a 7-cycle graph
remains open [19]. The best known upper bound on the
Shannon capacity is given by a quantity called the Lova´sz
theta function [16].
We now discuss some cases for which we can exactly
determine Ξ(U ). We have the following results for per-
fect graphs ([20], Ch. 3) and cyclic graphs.
Corollary 4.17: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Suppose U
satisfies Assumption 4.1. If Gs is a perfect graph, then
Ξ(U ) = α(Gs).
In the proof of Theorem 4.15, we did not require Assumption 4.1
for the Cases 1 and 2. Thereby, the conclusion holds even for general
utility functions. We use this fact in Theorem A.1 in Appendix.
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Proof : For a perfect graph, Θ(Gs) = α(Gs) [16]. Using
this and Theorem 4.16, we get Ξ(U ) = α(Gs).
Recall that the class of perfect graphs is the same as the
class of graphs that do not contain odd holes and odd
anti-holes [21]. As such the corollary above applies to
all such Gs. As a special case, recall the definition of a
cycle graph given in Definition 2.8. Since cycle graphs
with even number of vertices are perfect graphs, we have
the following result.
Corollary 4.18: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Suppose U
satisfies Assumption 4.1. If Gs is a q-cycle graph, where
q is even, then
Ξ(U ) =
q
2
.
Proof : Cycle graphs with even number of vertices are
perfect graphs. Thus, α(Gs) = q/2. Using Corollary 4.17,
we get the result.
One of the cases for which Gs is a cycle graph is when the
sender always prefers the next alphabet over the observed
alphabet. We discuss this case in the following and show
that Ξ(U ) of such a sender is q/2.
Corollary 4.19: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Suppose U
satisfies Assumption 4.1 and is such that for all i, j ∈
X , i 6= j,
U (i, i) < U (j, i) if j = (i+ 1)mod q,
U (i, i) > U (j, i) if j 6= (i+ 1)mod q and j 6= i.
Then,
Ξ(U ) =
q
2
.
Proof : We have U (i, i) < U (j, i) if and only if
j = (i + 1)mod q for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}.
Thus, i ∼ j if and only if j = (i + 1)mod q for all
i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q− 1}, which shows that the graph Gs is
a q-cycle graph. Using Corollary 4.18, we get the result.
Since the sender is always shifting, it seems that the
receiver cannot ever recover the true sequence. However,
this is not the case as the graph induced by such shifting
is just a cycle graph. Thus, for q ≥ 4, the receiver can
recover an exponentially large number of sequences even
for the case of the shifting sender.
Apart from the cases where the Shannon capacity of
Gs is equal to the independence number of Gs, we
cannot say much about Ξ(U ). Determining the hardness
of computing the capacity remains open and is still an
ongoing work.
The following table mentions some of the graphs with
known Shannon capacity.
Nodes α(Gs) Ξ(Gs) Θ(Gs)
n = 3 2 2 2
1 1 1
n = 4 3 3 3
2 2 2
2 2 2
n = 5 2 2 ≤ Ξ(Gs) ≤
√
5
√
5
For graphs with less than or equal to 4 vertices, the
Shannon capacity is equal to α(Gs), and hence Ξ(U ) is
known and is equal to α(Gs). This is because all graphs
up to vertex size 4 are perfect. The smallest non-perfect
graph is the pentagon graph for which the upper and lower
bounds in Theorem 4.15 do not match. Hence we do not
know Ξ(U ) for this case.
V. NOISY CHANNEL MODEL
A. Stackelberg equilibrium of the game
In this section, we discuss the results for the case
where the sender communicates with the receiver via a
noisy channel. We begin by computing the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the game given in Definition 2.2. Using
the notions of the sender graph and confusability graph
defined in the Section II-B, we determine the maximum
number of sequences that can be recovered by the receiver
in any equilibrium of the game.
Recall the definition of the perfectly decoded set
D(gn, sn) from (6), when the receiver plays gn and the
sender plays sn. Further, for any strategy gn of the
receiver, we define
S (gn) = arg min
sn∈B(gn)
|D(gn, sn)|. (17)
Thus, S (gn) are the set of best responses which give the
least objective value to the receiver. Further, we define
Z(y) = supp(PZ|Y (·|y)),
where y is an input to the channel. Note that since the
output space of the channel is X n, we have Z(y) ⊆ X n
for all y. In the following lemma, we characterize the set
D(gn, sn) in terms of the support sets Z(sn(x)).
Lemma 5.1: For any pair of strategies (gn, sn),
D(gn, sn) = {x ∈ X n | gn(z) = x ∀ z ∈ Z(sn(x))} .
Moreover, for all distinct x, x′ ∈ D(gn, sn), we have
Z(sn(x)) ∩ Z(sn(x′)) = ∅.
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Proof : Consider a pair of strategies (gn, sn) and let x ∈
D(gn, sn). We write
P(X̂ = x|X = x)
= P(gn(Z) = x|X = x)
=
∑
z∈Z(sn(x))
PZ|Y (z|sn(x))I{gn(z) = x}.
For any x ∈ X n, we get P(X̂ = x|X = x) = 1 if and
only if I{gn(z) = x} = 1 for all z ∈ Z(sn(x)). This
proves the first part of the result.
We prove the second part of the lemma by contra-
diction. Suppose there exist distinct sequences x¯, x̂ ∈
D(gn, sn) such that Z(sn(x¯)) ∩ Z(sn(x̂)) 6= ∅. Thus
there exists a zˇ ∈ Z(sn(x¯)) ∩ Z(sn(x̂)) such that
PZ|Y (zˇ|sn(x¯))PZ|Y (zˇ|sn(x̂)) > 0. However, from the
above characterization of D(gn, sn), we have gn(zˇ) = x¯
and gn(zˇ) = x̂, which cannot hold since x¯ 6= x̂.
Hence Z(sn(x¯)) ∩ Z(sn(x̂)) = ∅ for all distinct x¯, x̂ ∈
D(gn, sn).
Thus, for every x ∈ D(gn, sn), we have a corresponding
support set Z(sn(x)) that is disjoint from the support set
corresponding to any other sequence in D(gn, sn). Hence
two sequences can be recovered perfectly by the receiver
if and only if the inputs to the channel corresponding to
these sequences do not generate the same output.
The following lemma shows that for any strategy gn,
the perfectly decoded set D(gn, sn) forms an independent
set in Gn
s
for all sn ∈ S (gn).
Lemma 5.2: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with utility
U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph. Let
gn be any strategy of the receiver. Then, D(gn, sn) is an
independent set in Gn
s
for all strategies sn ∈ S (gn).
Proof : For strategies gn such that
minsn∈S (Gs) |D(gn, sn)| ≤ 1, the claim trivially
holds.
Let gn be such that |D(gn, sn)| ≥ 2 for all strategies sn.
Consider a strategy sn ∈ S (gn) for the sender. Consider
distinct sequences x¯, x̂ ∈ D(gn, sn). We first show that
Un(x¯, x¯) ≥ Un(x̂, x¯). From Lemma 5.1, we have for
distinct x¯, x̂ ∈ D(gn, sn), a pair of support sets Z(sn(x¯))
and Z(sn(x̂)) such that Z(sn(x¯)) ∩ Z(sn(x̂)) = ∅ and
gn(z) = x¯ ∀ z ∈ Z(sn(x¯)),
gn(z) = x̂ ∀ z ∈ Z(sn(x̂)).
Thus,
E
[
Un(gn(Z), x¯)
]
=
∑
z∈Z(sn(x¯))
P (z|sn(x¯))Un(gn(z), x¯)
= Un(x¯, x¯). (18)
Moreover, since sn is a best response of the sender, we
get
Un(x¯, x¯) =
∑
z∈Z(sn(x¯))
P (z|sn(x¯))Un(gn(z), x¯)
≥
∑
z∈Z(s¯n(x¯))
P (z|s¯n(x¯))Un(gn(z), x¯) ∀ s¯n.
(19)
In particular, for a strategy s¯n defined as
s¯n(x) =
{
sn(x) x 6= x¯
sn(x̂) x = x¯
, (20)
we have∑
z∈Z(s¯n(x¯))
P (z|s¯n(x¯))Un(gn(z), x¯)
=
∑
z∈Z(sn(x̂))
P (z|sn(x̂))Un(gn(z), x¯) = Un(x̂, x¯).
(21)
Using the above in (19), we get Un(x¯, x¯) ≥ Un(x̂, x¯).
In fact this holds with strict inequality. We prove this by
contradiction. Suppose Un(x¯, x¯) = Un(x̂, x¯). Then, s¯n is
also a best response since, s¯n(x) = sn(x) for all x 6= x¯.
For x = x¯, we have s¯n(x¯) = sn(x̂) and hence using (21),
we get∑
z∈Z(s¯n(x¯))
P (z|s¯n(x¯))Un(gn(z), x¯)
= Un(x̂, x¯)
= Un(x¯, x¯) =
∑
z∈Z(sn(x¯))
P (z|sn(x¯))Un(gn(z), x¯),
where the last equality follows from (18).
Now for all x 6= x¯, we have sn(x) = s¯(x). Thus, for
x 6= x¯, x ∈ D(gn, sn) if and only if x ∈ D(gn, s¯n).
However, for the sequence x¯, we have for all z ∈
Z(s¯n(x¯)), gn(z) = x̂ 6= x¯ and thus x¯ does not lie in
D(gn, s¯n). Hence D(gn, s¯n) ⊂ D(gn, sn) which gives
|D(gn, s¯n)| < |D(gn, sn)|. However, this is a contradic-
tion, since sn ∈ S (gn) and hence Un(x¯, x¯) > Un(x̂, x¯)
holds. Since x¯, x̂ were arbitrary, we get that D(gn, sn) is
an independent set in Gn
s
for all strategies sn ∈ S (gn).
Thus, for a set to be decoded perfectly by the receiver,
it is necessary that the set is an independent set in Gn
s
.
However, unlike in the case with the noiseless channel,
this condition is not sufficient. Not every independent set
of Gn
s
can be recovered by the receiver, since the capacity
of the channel plays a role. The next result gives an upper
bound on the maximum number of sequences that can be
decoded by the receiver.
Lemma 5.3: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with utility
U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph. Let Gn
c
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be the confusability graph of the channel PZ|Y . For any
strategy gn of the receiver,
min
sn∈B(gn)
|D(gn, sn)| ≤ min {α(Gns ), α(Gnc )} .
Proof : Let gn be a strategy for the receiver. From
Lemma 5.2, D(gn, sn) is an independent set in Gns for
all strategies sn ∈ S (gn). Thus, |D(gn, sn)| ≤ α(Gns ).
The following shows that |D(gn, sn)| ≤ α(Gnc ) as well.
Since D(gn, sn) =
{x ∈ X n | gn(z) = x ∀ z ∈ Z(sn(x))}, there exists
|D(gn, sn)| number of input sequences
{
sn(x
(i))
}
and
support sets
{Z(sn(x(i)))} such that
Z(sn(x(i))) ∩ Z(sn(x(j))) = ∅ ∀ i 6= j,
with i, j ∈ {1, . . . , |D(gn, sn)|}. This implies
PZ|Y (z|sn(x(i)))PZ|Y (z|sn(x(j))) = 0 for all
i 6= j. Thus, the set of input sequences {sn(x(i))},
form an independent set in the graph Gn
c
. Since
|D(gn, sn)| =
∣∣{sn(x(i))}∣∣, we get |D(gn, sn)| ≤ α(Gnc ).
This holds for all strategies sn of the sender and
in particular for all strategies in S (gn). Thus
|D(gn, sn)| ≤ α(Gnc ) for all sn ∈ S (gn).
The following is the proof of the main result of the
section, which shows that the upper bound derived in the
above lemma is achieved by the Stackelberg equilibrium
strategies of the receiver.
The idea of the proof is as follows. We con-
sider the independent sets in Gn
s
and Gn
c
of the size
min{α(Gn
s
), α(Gn
c
)} denoted as Is and Ic respectively.
For every channel input sequence in Ic, the receiver maps
the corresponding output set to a unique sequence in Is.
This establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the
sequences in Is and Ic. Since Is is an independent set in
Gn
s
, the sender has to comply with the receiver and maps
the sequences to their respective input sequences in Ic.
The receiver is thus able to recover the set Ic of size
min{α(Gn
s
), α(Gn
c
)}.
Theorem 5.4: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with utility
U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph. Let Gn
c
be the confusability graph of the channel PZ|Y . For all
Stackelberg equilibrium strategies g∗n of the receiver,
min
sn∈B(g∗n)
|D(g∗n, sn)| = min{α(Gns ), α(Gnc )}.
Proof : From Lemma 5.3, we have for all strategies gn,
min
sn∈B(gn)
|D(gn, sn)| ≤ min{α(Gns ), α(Gnc )}.
This upper bound can be achieved as follows. Let d =
min{α(Gn
s
), α(Gn
c
)}. Since d ≤ α(Gn
s
), there exists an
independent set Is in G
n
s
such that |Is| = d. Similarly,
there exists an independent set Ic in G
n
c
such that |Ic| = d.
Using these independent sets Is and Ic, we define gn as
follows.
Let the sequences in the sets Is and Ic be denoted
as x(i) and y(i) respectively, with i ∈ {1, . . . , d} and
x(i), y(i) ∈ X n. With this convention, we define the
strategy gn as
gn(z) =
{
x(i) if z ∈ Z(y(i))
∆ if z /∈ ⋃di=1Z(y(i)) . (22)
We now show that the strategy gn of the receiver ensures
that all strategies sn in the best response set B(gn) are
such that Z(sn(x(i))) = Z(y(i)) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Fix an index i, let sn be any strategy for the sender and
let sn(x
(i)) = y∗. Then the utility of the sender is
E
[
Un(gn(Z), x
(i))
]
=
∑
z∈Z(y∗)
PZ|Y (z|y∗)Un(gn(z), x(i)).
We consider two cases. First suppose Z(y∗) ⊆⋃d
i=1Z(y(i)). Writing Z(y∗) =
⋃d
i=1Z(y∗) ∩ Z(y(j)),
we get
E
[
Un(gn(Z), x
(i))
]
=
d∑
j=1
∑
z∈Z(y∗)∩Z(y(j))
PZ|Y (z|y∗)Un(gn(z), x(i))
=
d∑
j=1
∑
z∈Z(y∗)∩Z(y(j))
PZ|Y (z|y∗)Un(x(j), x(i)).
The last equation follows from the definition of gn.
Since Is is an independent set in G
n
s
, Un(x
(j), x(i)) <
Un(x
(i), x(i)) for all j 6= i and hence
d∑
j=1
∑
z∈Z(y∗)∩Z(y(j))
PZ|Y (z|y∗)Un(x(j), x(i))
≤
d∑
j=1
∑
z∈Z(y∗)∩Z(y(j))
PZ|Y (z|y∗)Un(x(i), x(i))
=
∑
z∈Z(y∗)
PZ|Y (z|y∗)Un(x(i), x(i))
= Un(x
(i), x(i)),
with equality if and only if Z(y∗) = Z(y(i)). In the
second case, suppose Z(y∗) * ⋃di=1Z(y(i)). Then, there
exists some z ∈ Z(y∗) such that z /∈ ⋃di=1Z(y(i)). Then,
gn(z) = ∆ which gives that E
[
Un(gn(Z), x
(i))
]
= −∞.
Thus, the optimal choice of strategy for the sender is
sn(x
(i)) = y∗ where y∗ is any sequence such that
Z(y∗) = Z(y(i)). Clearly, this holds for all sn ∈ B(gn)
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
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It easy to see that the utility of the sender and the
receiver do not depend on the exact choice of y∗ so long
as Z(y∗) = Z(y(i)). Hence, without loss of generality,
we consider sn to be such that sn(x
(i)) = y(i) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Thus, when the sequence x(i) ∈ Is
is observed by the sender, it encodes it as y(i). The
channel generates an output z, which belongs to the
support set Z(y(i)). The receiver maps all such z to
x(i) thereby ensuring P(X̂ = x(i)|X = x(i)) = 1 for
all i. Thus, for all x(i) ∈ Is and sn ∈ B(gn), we
get x(i) ∈ D(gn, sn). Hence D(gn, sn) ⊇ Is for all
sn ∈ B(gn). Since |Is| = d, we get |D(gn, sn)| ≥ d.
Using |D(gn, sn)| ≤ d = min{α(Gns ), α(Gnc )}, we
get that for all Stackelberg equilibrium strategies g∗n,
minsn∈B(g∗n) |D(g∗n, sn)| = min{α(Gns ), α(Gnc )}.
Thus, from the strategy defined in (22), we see that
the receiver decodes meaningfully only for a subset of
sequences. In particular, it chooses d number of inputs,
y(i) with i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, which can be distinguished from
each other and maps the respective support sets, Z(y(i)),
to d distinct sequences x(i). For the rest of the outputs
from the channel, the receiver declares an error ∆. In
response, the optimal strategy for the sender is (without
loss of generality) such that it maps the sequences x(i) to
the inputs y(i). Note that in the above proof we do not
discuss the strategy of the sender for sequences which are
not amongst the x(i). However, it can be said that for all
strategies sn and for all x ∈ X n, sn(x) = y∗, where y∗ is
such that Z(y∗) ⊆ ⋃di=1Z(y(i)). This is because for any
other input y′ 6= y∗, if Z(y′) * ⋃di=1Z(y(i)), then the
channel output z may lie outside
⋃d
i=1Z(y(i)) for which
gn(z) = ∆ and the corresponding utility is −∞.
Example 5.1. Let X = {0, 1, 2} and consider the utility
U defined in Example 2.1 and the channel PZ|Y defined
in Example 2.2. Recall that the graph Gs induced by
U is a path and hence α(Gs) = 2. This gives that for
any n, α(Gn
s
) ≥ 2n. Further, it can be observed that the
graph Gc induced by the channel PZ|Y is a perfect graph,
since there is an edge between 0 and 1 while 2 is an
isolated vertex. Thus, we have α(Gn
c
) = 2n for all n.
This follows since Gn
c
is a strong product graph. Hence,
from Theorem 5.4, the maximum information that can be
extracted from the sender in this setting for a given n is
2n. 
B. Rate of information extraction
Recall the definition of the rate of information extrac-
tion for a strategy gn given in Definition 3.1. Using this,
we define the following asymptotic quantity.
Definition 5.1 (Asymptotic rate of information extrac-
tion): Let {g∗n}n≥1 be a sequence of Stackelberg equi-
librium strategies for the receiver and let R(g∗n) be the
corresponding rate of information extraction. The asymp-
totic rate of information extraction, denoted byR, is given
as
R = lim sup
n
R(g∗n).
For the noiseless channel case, this quantity is equal to
the information extraction capacity of the sender. We now
use the results derived in the earlier sections to determine
the asymptotic rate of information extraction R for the
noisy channel case.
Theorem 5.5: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Let Gc be
the confusability graph of the channel PZ|Y . Then the
asymptotic rate of information extraction is given as
R = min{Ξ(U ),Θ(Gc)}.
Proof : Let g∗n be a sequence of Stackelberg equilibrium
strategies for the receiver. From Theorem 5.4,
min
sn∈B(g∗n)
|D(g∗n, sn)| = min{α(Gns ), α(Gnc )}.
It can be shown that, for a discrete memoryless channel
given by (5), the graph Gn
c
is same as the graph con-
structed by taking n-fold strong product of Gc [15], i.e.,
Gn
c
= G⊠n
c
= Gc ⊠ . . .⊠Gc.
Thus, minsn∈B(g∗n) |D(g∗n, sn)| = min{α(Gns ), α(G⊠nc )}
and hence
R(g∗n) = min
sn∈S (g∗n)
|D(g∗n, sn)|1/n
= min
{
α(Gn
s
)1/n, α(G⊠n
c
)1/n
}
.
Taking the limit, we get that R = min{Ξ(U ),Θ(Gc)}.
The above result states that given a sender with informa-
tion extraction capacity Ξ(U ), the zero-error capacity of
the channel should be at least this number in order to
extract maximum possible information from the sender.
Alternatively, given the channel, the asymptotic rate of
information extraction from any sender is bounded by
the zero-error capacity of the channel. As long as both
quantities are greater than unity, the receiver can extract
exponentially large number of sequences from the sender.
Using this result, we have the following when Assump-
tion 4.1 holds.
Theorem 5.6: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Let Gc be the
confusability graph of the channel PZ|Y . Further, let U
satisfy Assumption 4.1. If Θ(Gs) ≤ Θ(Gc), then
R = Ξ(U ).
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Proof : Since Assumption 4.1 holds, from Theorem 4.16,
we have α(Gs) ≤ Ξ(U ) ≤ Θ(Gs). Further, from
Theorem 5.5, we have R = min{Ξ(U ),Θ(Gc)}. Using
Θ(Gs) ≤ Θ(Gc), we get Ξ(U ) ≤ Θ(Gc) and hence
R = Ξ(U ).
The above result states that if the Shannon capacity of
the sender graph is less than the zero-error capacity
of the channel, then the asymptotic rate of information
extraction is simply the information extraction capacity
of the sender. The following theorem gives the rate when
the zero-error capacity of the channel is no more than the
independence number of the sender graph.
Theorem 5.7: Consider a sender with utility U and
let Gs be the corresponding sender graph. Let Gc be the
confusability graph of the channel PZ|Y . Further, let U
satisfy Assumption 4.1. If α(Gs) ≥ Θ(Gc), then
R = Θ(Gc).
Proof : Since Assumption 4.1 holds, from Theorem 4.16,
we have α(Gs) ≤ Ξ(U ) ≤ Θ(Gs). Further, from
Theorem 5.5, we have R = min {Ξ(U ),Θ(Gc)}. Using
Θ(Gc) ≤ α(Gs), we get Θ(Gc) ≤ Ξ(U ) and hence
R = Θ(Gc).
Thus, we see that the receiver can recover an exponential
number of sequences even when the information extrac-
tion capacity of the sender is less than the zero-error
capacity of the channel. This holds provided Θ(Gc) > 1.
With this we conclude our analysis on this topic of
information extraction from a strategic sender. We have
seen that the strategic setting demands a new line of anal-
ysis, that uses in part the traditional tools of information
theory, but is rooted in concepts of game theory. It also
leads to new concepts. Our main take away is that the
information extraction capacity of the sender, a concept
we defined and introduced in this paper, appears to be a
fundamental quantity. It plays a role loosely analogous to
that of the entropy of a source, characterizing the extent
of information the sender can provide (or can be extracted
from it). Future research will reveal the extent to which
this analogy holds.
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude, we studied a non-cooperative communi-
cation problem where the receiver wishes to recover infor-
mation from a misreporting sender with zero probability
of error. We considered a receiver-centric viewpoint and
posed the problem as a leader-follower game with the
receiver as the leader and sender as the follower. We
formulated two instances of the game, with a noiseless
channel, and with a noisy channel. We showed that even
in the presence of the noisy channel, the receiver can
perfectly extract an exponential number of sequences.
To achieve this, the optimal choice of strategy for the
receiver is to play a selective decoding strategy that
decodes meaningfully only for a subset of sequences and
deliberately induces an error on the rest of the sequences.
The sequences are chosen such that the sender does not
have an incentive to misreport any sequence as other,
whereby, it tells the truth.
Our analysis led to new concepts: the rate of informa-
tion extraction and the information extraction capacity of
the sender. We showed that the maximum rate of infor-
mation extraction is equal to the information extraction
capacity of the sender in the noiseless channel case. In
the presence of the noisy channel, the receiver can still
extract information with this rate, provided the zero-error
capacity of the channel is larger than the information
extraction capacity of the sender. We derived a linear
programming based condition to check if the capacity
is maximum. We also discussed a sufficient condition
on the utility under which this condition holds. We then
derived a condition for which the capacity is strictly less
than the maximum. We showed that, in this case, the
capacity is bounded above by the Shannon capacity of
an appropriately defined graph.
APPENDIX
The appendices below contain additional material on
the topic, and the skipped proofs.
A. Cartesian product graph is a subgraph of sender
graph
We have observed that the sender graph may not be a
graph product of Gs. Moreover, from Section IV-C, we
showed that if U satisfies Assumption 4.1, the strong
product graph G⊠n
s
is a subgraph of Gn
s
. For general
U , we have the following structural result where we
show that the n-fold Cartesian product graph of Gs is
a subgraph of Gn
s
.
Theorem A.1: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with utility
U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph. Let
Gn
s
be the n-fold Cartesian product of Gs. Then, G
n
s
is a subgraph of Gn
s
.
Proof : From Definition 2.5, we can observe that the
Cases 1 and 2 in the proof of Theorem 4.15 are the
conditions for a graph product to be a Cartesian product.
Further, these cases did not require the Assumption 4.1
and hence the conclusion holds for general utility
functions. Thus, the proof is identical to the proof of
Theorem 4.15 barring Case 3 and hence, we get that
Gn
s
is a subgraph of Gn
s
for all n.
The following corollary gives an upper bound on the
independence number of Gn
s
.
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Corollary A.2: Let n ∈ N. Consider a sender with
utility U and let Gn
s
be the corresponding sender graph.
Let Gn
s
be the n-fold Cartesian product of Gs. Then,
α(Gn
s
) ≤ α(Gn
s
).
Proof : The upper bound follows from Theorem A.1.
It can be shown that the limit of the quantity α(Gn
s
)1/n
exists and is equal to q ([22], Ch. 27). Thus, the upper
bound given in the above corollary is not informative in
the limit.
Remark: The graph Gn
s
may be a strict subset of Gn
s
.
Consider the vertices x, y, v, w ∈ X where x ∼ y and
v ∼ w in Gs. Clearly, (x, v) ≁ (y,w) in G2s = GsGs.
Suppose U (x, x) < U (y, x) and U (v, v) < U (w, v).
Now consider the following difference of utilities.
U2(xv, xv) −U2(yw, xv) = 1
2
(U (x, x)−U (y, x)
+U (v, v) −U (w, v)) .
Thus, we get U2(xv, xv) < U2(yw, xv) and hence xv ∼
yw in G2
s
. This gives that G2
s
⊂ G2
s
. 
B. Proof of Lemma 4.14
Suppose Un(x, x) = Un(y, x). First, we show that for
all i, either xi = yi or xi ∼ yi.
Assume there exists an i such that xi 6= yi and xi ≁ yi.
Consider the i length sequence wi := (x1, . . . , xi) and
vi := (y1, . . . , yi). Since xi 6= yi and xi ≁ yi, from
the definition of strong product, we get wi ≁ vi. From
wi ≁ vi, we get x ≁ y where x = (wi, xi+1, . . . , xn) and
y = (vi, yi+1, . . . , yn) are derived by taking the product
of G⊠i ⊠ G⊠n−i. However, this contradicts x ∼ y and
hence for all i either xi = yi or xi ∼ yi.
Now consider the following difference
Un(x, x)−Un(y, x) =
∑
i:xi 6=yi
U (xi, xi)−U (yi, xi).
Since xi ∼ yi whenever xi 6= yi, we can write
Un(x, x)−Un(y, x)
= (K1 − L1)|U (x1, x1)−U (y1, x1)|,
where K1 = |{i | U (xi, xi) > U (yi, xi)}| and L1 =
|{i | U (xi, xi) < U (yi, xi)}|. The factor |U (x1, x1) −
U (y1, x1)| due to the Assumption 4.1. Similarly, we can
write
Un(y, y)−Un(x, y)
= (K2 − L2)|U (x1, x1)−U (y1, x1)|,
where K2 = |{i | U (yi, yi) > U (xi, yi)}| and L2 =
|{i | U (yi, yi) < U (xi, yi)}|. When U (xi, xi) >
U (yi, xi), we have U (yi, yi) < U (xi, yi), due to xi ∼
yi. Thus, we get
{i | U (xi, xi) > U (yi, xi)}
⊆ {i | U (yi, yi) < U (xi, yi)}
and hence K1 ≤ L2. Similarly, we can show K2 ≤ L1.
Since Un(x, x) = Un(y, x), we have K1 = L1. Thus,
K2−L2 ≤ L1−K1 = 0 and hence Un(y, y) ≤ Un(x, y).
C. Proof of Lemma 4.12
Let k be the length of the directed cycle in Gs.
Without loss of generality, assume that {0, . . . , k − 1}
form the k-length directed cycle. We now show that
there exists a permutation matrix W ∈ Q \ I such that∑
i,j U [i, j]W [i, j] ≤ 0.
From the definition of a directed cycle, we have for all
i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
U (i, i) ≤ U (j, i) for j = (i+ 1)mod k,
and hence for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, U [i, j] ≤ 0 if j =
(i+ 1)mod k. Define W as follows
W [i, j] =

1 if i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}
and j = (i+ 1)mod k
1 if i > k − 1 and j = i
0 else
.
With the above assignment, we get a matrix
W =
(
W(k−1)×(k−1) 0
0 I(q−k+1)×(q−k+1)
)
,
whereW(k−1)×(k−1) ∈ {0, 1}(k−1)×(k−1) is a permutation
matrix and I(q−k+1)×(q−k+1) ∈ R(q−k+1)×(q−k+1) is an
identity matrix. All other entries are 0. Clearly, W ∈ Q\
{I}. Thus, we get∑
i,j
U [i, j]W [i, j]
=
∑
i≤k−1
U [i, (i + 1)mod k] +
∑
i>k−1
U [i, i]
≤ 0.
Thus, OPT(LP ) is not positive.
D. Proof of Lemma 4.13
Consider i, j ∈ X for which U [i, j] < 0. Take
W [i, j] =W [j, i] = 1. Further, take
W [k, l] =
{
1 if k = l, k 6= i, j
0 if k 6= l and k 6= i, j, l 6= i, j .
Clearly, we have∑
k
W [k, l] = 1 ∀ l 6= i, j∑
l
W [k, l] = 1 ∀ k 6= i, j.
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Further, for l = i and l = j,
∑
kW [k, l] = W [j, i] and
W [i, j] respectively. Similarly, we can show
∑
lW [k, l] =
1 for k = i and k = j. Hence,
∑
kW [k, l] = 1 for all
l and
∑
lW [k, l] = 1 for all k. Thus, W is feasible for
LP . Further,∑
k,l
U [k, l]W [k, l] = U [i, j] + U [j, i] ≤ 0.
The last inequality follows from Assumption 4.1, which
gives |U [i, j]| = |U [j, i]|.
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